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1 Introduction
The accumulated knowledge of the FDI literature (see for example the survey by Helpman, 2006)
has provided us a good understanding of the incentives and constraints of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in their choices (of organizational forms and production locations) in response to their
own characteristics, the nature of the industry, and the country where they operate from. In
these existing theoretical frameworks, MNEs are often theorized to be based in the North. This
supposition, although understandable given the North MNEs’ leading edge in R&D and technology,
is increasingly incongruent with the facts. In 2006-2010, 17% of the world FDI outflows originate
from the South (Dixit, 2012). At the same time, the share of FDI inflows received by the developing
country from the peer South is disproportionately larger at 36% in 2000 (Aykut and Ratha, 2004).
By 2013, FDI from developing countries (including transition economies) has accounted for 39%
of global FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 2014). It thus seems useful that theoretical framework be
established to formalize the comparative advantages of South-based MNEs. This paper aims to
make one such contribution.1
It has been suggested by a lecture of Dixit (2012) that similarly poor governance endowments
may be a source of comparative advantage for South-based MNEs when investing in developing
countries. Several empirical studies (Darby et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Be´nassy-
Que´re´ et al., 2007; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) have found patterns consistent with this hypothesis.2
In these studies, ‘experiences’, ‘skills’ and ‘abilities’ of firms based in the South ‘to manage under
difficult conditions’ and their ‘familiarity’ with the norms in the host country are often cited as the
potential explanations. Exactly how these comparative advantages arise endogenously is, however,
1In the general framework of Arkolakis et al. (2013), it is possible to have MNEs originating from all countries.
However, because the pattern of multinational production (MP) is determined in large part by efficiency parameters
Til characterizing productivity of firms originating from i conducting MP production in country l, the framework
implies a dominance of MNEs based in the North given their technology superiority. Second, the efficiency parameters
Til by assumption are separable in innovation and production efficiencies: Til = T
e
i T
p
l . This in general does not imply
a systematic complementarity pattern in bilateral FDI flows within development stages (South-South or North-North).
2Darby et al. (2010) found that South MNEs are less (or not at all) deterred by bad institutional quality in the host
country than North MNE, based on bilateral FDI count data (on the number of MNEs from a country of origin present
in a destination country). Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) measured the proportion of developing-country MNEs
among the largest foreign firms in each of 50 LDCs and found that developing-country MNEs are more prevalent in
LDCs with poorer regulatory quality and lower control of corruption (although this negative relationship does not
apply to all aspects of institutional quality, e.g., rule of law). Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007), using a gravity model
for bilateral FDI from OECD countries to the other countries, found that good institutions in the home country
have no or even negative impact on outward FDI, and institutional distance has often a negative impact on bilateral
FDI. Last but not least, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) focused on corruption and observed that the distance in the
corruption level between the home and host countries reduce bilateral FDI flows.
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less than fully understood, because often the relative cost advantages of the North and South MNEs
have been assumed rather than derived.
In this paper, I propose a theoretical model to micro-found the cost structure of firms, given their
endogenous response to the state institutions in which they are based and where their production
facilities might be. Firms’ optimal choice of FDI location, sourcing decision (FDI or domestic
production), and production decision (produce or not) are fully characterized, in a vertical-FDI
model with many countries, industries, and heterogeneous firms. I arrive at the main hypothesis
that predicts an institutional complementarity pattern across countries in bilateral FDI flows at
both the firm and country levels.
The theory is built on the fundamental assumption that the fixed operating cost of firms in-
creases with poorer state institutions, but decreases with firms’ own investment in informal insti-
tutions, and the investment in informal institutions is more effective in reducing overhead cost in
environments of poorer formal institutions. As an endogenous outcome, when and where the formal
institutions are weaker, the private sector tends to build more informal institutions to substitute
the former. There is a vast intellectual literature that documents the endogenous response of the
private sector to the formal institutions the state provides. Evidence abounds and we may for the
purpose of exposition classify them into economic, legal and political informal institutions. First,
where the market-supporting institutions such as contract enforcement and bank credit are lacking,
firms tend to fill in the void with relational contracting and trade credit. These patterns are doc-
umented for example by McMillan and Woodruff (2002) for Russia, China, Poland and Vietnam.
McMillan and Woodruff (1999a,b) provide detailed accounts of how these informal economic insti-
tutions work in Vietnam under reputation incentives and threat of community sanction. A similar
argument is suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) that reputation-based mechanisms can, at
least in part, alleviate the problems originating from weak contracting institutions.
Second, where the state legal institution is weak, the private sector tends to turn to informal legal
institutions such as private patrols, private protection agencies or informal courts to substitute for
police protection and judicial systems (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). For example, Frye and Zhuravskaia
(2000) find that higher levels of regulation and weak legal institutions are associated with a higher
probability of contact with a private protection organization in Russia.
Finally (and perhaps the most controversial of the three given its many faceted implications),
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where the state’s bureaucratic system is inefficient and regulatory quality poor, firms tend to
build political connection (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006) with politicians and government officials, or
directly participate in politics. Political connection may help firms reduce regulatory burden (eg.,
fewer days to obtain business permit, fewer agencies to register or fewer on-site inspections) but also
secure property rights (eg., lower expropriation via tax or fines) and enforce contracts. For example,
Li et al. (2006) found that in China, the probability of entrepreneurs entering politics decreases by
8-20% when the institutional index in a region improves by one standard deviation. Chen et al.
(2011) similarly show that firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which
the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. Bai et al. (2014) provide a
vivid account of how in the aluminum and auto industries, Chinese local governments may have a
large leverage in providing public goods (such as land and capital) to their cronies and alter the
terms of competition in the market. In general, firms may engage in all three types of informal
institutional building (economic, legal or political). For example, Cai et al. (2011) infer that the
entertainment and travel costs expenditures of Chinese firms consist of grease money to obtain
better government services, protection money to lower tax rates, and also business expenditures to
build relational capital with suppliers and clients.3
The heavier investment in informal institution by firms based in the South then gives them
comparative advantages in conducting FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, because
the adverse effect of weak institutions at the destination on fixed cost is reduced by the firm-
specific institutional investment and more so in destinations of weaker institutions. Thus, a MNE
from a country of poorer state institutions than another MNE will tend more likely to invest in a
destination of poorer state institutions than the other MNE’s choice of destination, all else being
equal. I go on to develop the implications on the volume of bilateral FDI flows at the country
level, given the firm-level choice of FDI destination across sectors of different market sizes and
across firms of heterogeneous productivity levels. The model generates the endogenous presence of
zero FDI across some bilateral country relations. Conditional on positive bilateral FDI flows, the
institutional complementarity continues to hold at the ‘intensive margin’: multinational firms will
3The term informal institution has been used in the literature to refer to many things ranging from customs,
traditions, norms, religion (Williamson, 2000), social capital, trust (Chan et al., 2015) to culture. Here, I adopt the
definition of Helmke and Levitsky (2004) that distinguishes informal institution from informal behavioral regularities,
shared values and the broader concept of culture. Specifically, informal institutions are defined as socially shared
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.
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generate more net profits in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional
environment at home. At the ‘extensive margin’, subject to certain qualifying conditions, more
multinational firms will conduct FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the
institutional environment at home.
Although the empirical studies I cited earlier have presented evidence, at least in part, support-
ing the above hypothesis, there are some limitations to these studies. For example, institutional
distance are often used as a control variable (except Darby et al., 2010) when the current theory
suggests that institutional interaction term should be used. Second, the countries included are
often restricted to the least developed countries as the host country (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc,
2008) or developed countries as the home country (Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). Third, when the
country coverage is comprehensive, it is often at the cost of using the FDI count data (ie, the
number or percentage of firms; Darby et al., 2010) instead of the FDI volume data. To address
these potential caveats, I assemble a dataset on bilateral FDI stocks (and flows) for 219 economies
in 2001-2010 based on the UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics. This extends the country coverage
to include almost all economies in the world, and enables us to look into the behavior of FDI flows
from (to) the whole spectrum of countries in terms of institutional quality. I measure the institu-
tional quality of countries by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators commonly used
in the literature. I test the theory’s main prediction of a positive assortative matching pattern in
institutions, by regressing FDI on the level and the interaction of institutional quality indicators
of the home and host countries, in addition to many potential FDI determinants suggested by the
literature. This includes an extensive set of gravity variables (to control for information barriers
or transaction costs), the home and host country characteristics (such as GDPs, GDPs per capita,
and general production cost levels), and also variables to control for competing hypotheses. In
particular, since income levels and institutional qualities are correlated, the difference in GDPs per
capita between the home and host countries is included to control for the Linder effect on FDI as
proposed by Fajgelbaum et al. (2015).
Overall, I find very robust support for the theory’s prediction. The coefficient on the institu-
tional interaction term is positive and significant, and the finding is robust to the FDI series used
(inward or outward, stocks or flows), the measure of institutional quality (voice and accountability
(VA), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and control of cor-
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ruption (CC)), the estimation specification (with or without time-varying home and host country
fixed effects), and the inclusion of zero FDI observations.
The strength of the complementarity varies across institutional indicators and robustness checks,
but the effects are systematically stronger for GE, RQ and VA, weaker for RL and CC, and the
weakest for political stability and absence of violence (PV). This pattern suggests an interesting
interpretation of the areas where informal institutions are feasible and prevalent, and where they
are not. Informal institutions tend to be built in response to inefficient public services or poor policy
formulation/implementation (GE and RQ); these firm-specific investment most likely corresponds
to political informal institutions such as political network or connections. To some extent, such
political informal institutions may also help firms to maneuver in a society with less government
political accountability (VA). On the other hand, economic and legal informal institutions such
as relational contracting and private enforcement mechanisms appear more costly for firms to
build in response to inefficient contract enforcement or property rights protection (RL and CC).
Finally, it appears extremely costly for firms to build legal informal institutions such as private
troops to guard against political violence, civil riots or terrorism (PV). To the extent that informal
institutions are very costly to build, we will expect to observe weak (or no) complementarity effect
in the corresponding institutional indicator (as the case of PV demonstrates).
Singapore often ranks among the top in terms of good governance. For example, in 2012,
it clinched the 1st in terms of GE and RQ, the 4th in CC, and the 5th in RL. Thus, when its
government undertook to jointly develop the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) with
the Chinese government in 1994, by transplanting its Singapore-style institutions overseas in the
Chinese land of cheap labor, it was greeted by the investor community with great enthusiasm. Take
a few examples from Pereira (2002):
We are a Western multinational company. We operate entirely above board. We don’t
like hidden costs and personal benefits in business. We came on the basis that there
would be a Singaporean system here. We can justify every single entry honestly in our
account books. (Manager, European company, male, Germany citizen, aged 40-50)
Things here [at the SIP] are very straightforward. All the rules are clear, all the person-
nel are very professional, and the estate is very modern. So this has allowed our company
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to focus on doing business rather than worry about all the other aspects. (Manager, US
company, male, Singapore citizen, aged 30-40)
Few expected that the joint venture would soon ‘sour’ in 2001. There are no typical barriers
in terms of language, ethnicity, or cultural origins. As the Singaporean leaders later reflected,
the Singapore government misjudged the importance of relationship with local authorities. In
particular, it underestimated the extent of latitude that the Chinese local officials had versus Beijing
in altering the terms of competition (Pereira, 2002). The quotations cited above and the overall
incident bring home the point that institutional endowments of an investor (what it is endowed
with in formal institutions and what it develops in informal institutions) play a non-negligible role
in the operation and the outcome of FDI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop the theoretical model and
predictions. In Section 3, I present the estimation framework and findings. Section 4 discusses
potential extensions and concludes.
2 Model
This model is designed to highlight the mechanism of institution on FDI activities, and to keep
the model tractable, I intentionally drop many other mechanisms that the previous literature has
shown to be important. Thus, it is not a quantitative FDI model that can be calibrated to the data.
Rather, the theoretical prediction in this section will be tested as a ‘partial’ effect of institution in
the empirical section (after controlling for other relevant determinants of FDI). I discuss possible
extensions of the current framework to incorporate these other elements of interest in Section 2.5.
For recent developments in quantitative FDI models, see for example Garetto (2013), Ramondo
and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013), Irarrazabal et al. (2013) and Arkolakis et al. (2013).
Suppose there are a continuum of countries indexed by r ∈ R, where r is an inverse measure
of the quality of formal institutions. The larger r is, the poorer the institution of the country.
There are a continuum of sectors indexed by j producing differentiated goods and one sector
producing homogeneous good (used as the numeraire). The only factor of production is labor, and
the homogeneous good is produced with constant unit labor requirement. I abstract away from
any kind of trade frictions (and thus the incentives of horizontal FDI driven by market access).
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This implies that there is a single world market for goods. Labor endowment is assumed to be
large enough in each country such that the homogeneous good is always produced. As a result,
a country’s labor productivity in the numeraire good determines its wage rate w. Countries with
better formal institutions are assumed to have higher labor productivity in the numeraire good and
hence a higher wage: w = ω(r) and ω′(r) ≡ dω(r)/dr < 0.
Each variety of the differentiated goods requires a headquarter service component and a manu-
factured component using a Cobb-Doublas production function (a` la Antra`s and Helpman, 2004),
where each component has a unit labor requirement equal to one. This implies a unit cost of
production equal to c = wηhw
1−η
d /φ, where φ indexes the productivity of the firm producing the
variety, η the headquarter intensity in the production, and wh and wd the wage rate of the country
where the headquarter and the manufacturing facility of the firm are located, respectively.
The world is populated by a unit measure of consumers with identical preferences: U = x0 +
1
µ
∫
Xµj dj, 0 < µ < 1, where x0 indicates the consumption of the numeraire good, and Xj a
CES function over all available varieties xj(i) in sector j with an elasticity of substitution σ.
I drop the sector index j below for the time being to simplify the notation. Given monopolistic
competition, the CES preferences imply the standard pricing and profit function. Each firm charges
a constant markup over its marginal cost of production p(c) = σσ−1c, sells a quantity of x(p(c)) =
X
σ(µ−1)+1
j p(c)
−σ and earns a variable profit:
pi = (p(c)− c)x(p(c))
= Bc1−σ
= Bφ˜
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ
, (1)
where B ≡ 1σX
σ(µ−1)+1
j
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
can be taken as an index of the world market size for the sector
(exogenous from the point of view of the individual supplier) and φ˜ ≡ φσ−1 a transformed index of
the firm productivity level.
2.1 Choice of Informal Institution
A firm given its productivity level chooses whether to produce or not. If it chooses to produce
both components at home, it incurs a fixed overhead cost f(rh, I), which depends on: i) the quality
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of the formal institution where the firm is headquartered and, ii) the informal institution I that
the firm invests in. If it chooses to produce the manufactured component in a country different
from where it is headquartered, it incurs an additional overhead cost f(rd, I), which depends on
the quality of the formal institution in the country where the production facility is located, and
similarly, its choice of informal institutional investment.
I make the following key assumptions on the technology of the informal institutional investment.
First, it is assumed that f(r, I) strictly increases in r (worse formal institution increases overhead
cost), strictly decreases in I (firm-specific informal institutional investment reduces overhead cost),
and
∂
∂r
(
∂f(r, I)
∂I
)
< 0, (2)
that is, informal institution is more effective in reducing overhead cost in environments of poorer
formal institutions. Second, the investment in informal institution is a common good within the
boundary of the firm: it can be used at home or in the country where its production facility is
located. Investing in informal institution, however, costs the firm k(I), which is increasing and
convex in I.
A firm chooses I∗ that minimizes F (rh, I) ≡ f(rh, I) + k(I) if it chooses local production and
IFDI,∗ that minimizes FFDI(rh, rd, I) ≡ f(rh, I) + f(rd, I) + k(I) if it chooses to undertake FDI.
Let F ∗(rh) ≡ minI {f(rh, I) + k(I)} and FFDI,∗(rh, rd) ≡ minI {f(rh, I) + f(rd, I) + k(I)}.
Proposition 1 (i) The investment in informal institution is higher for FDI than for local produc-
tion: IFDI,∗(rh, rd) > I∗(rh); (ii) The total fixed cost of production is higher for FDI than for local
production: FFDI,∗(rh, rd) > F ∗(rh); (iii) The total fixed cost of production is higher in FDI des-
tinations of poorer institutional qualities: dFFDI,∗/drd > 0; (iv) For a given FDI destination, the
total fixed cost of production is higher for MNEs based in countries of poorer institutional qualities:
dFFDI,∗/drh > 0.
Proof. (i) ∂F
FDI
∂I |I=I∗ = ∂f(rh,I
∗)
∂I +
∂f(rd,I
∗)
∂I + k
′(I∗) = ∂f(rd,I
∗)
∂I < 0, where the second equality
follows by the FOC condition for I∗: ∂f(rh,I
∗)
∂I + k
′(I∗) = 0, and the last inequality follows by
the assumption that f(r, I) strictly decreases in I. This implies that IFDI,∗ > I∗. (ii) We can
write FFDI,∗ − F ∗ = {FFDI,∗ − F (rh, IFDI,∗)}+ {F (rh, IFDI,∗)− F ∗} > 0. The inequality holds
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since FFDI,∗ − F (rh, IFDI,∗) = f(rd, IFDI,∗) > 0 by the setup, and F (rh, IFDI,∗)− F ∗ > 0 by the
definition of F ∗ and the fact that IFDI,∗ 6= I∗. (iii) By the envelope theorem, we have
dFFDI,∗
drd
=
∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
> 0 (3)
by the assumption that f(r, I) strictly increases in r. (iv) The proof is similar to (iii), by replacing
rd with rh.
The predictions in Proposition 1 are derived from the endogenous choice of I at the firm level
and yet are consistent with typical assumptions (observations) made in the FDI literature. First,
FDI sets a higher threshold than local production in terms of fixed costs. This will help explain the
typical sorting of MNEs and local firms in terms of productivity. Second, poor state institutions
discourage inward FDI by raising the total fixed cost of production FFDI,∗ (although at the same
time the country offers a cheaper labor force). Third, poor state institutions also impose an absolute
disadvantage on firms based in these countries; they incur a higher total fixed cost of production
FFDI,∗ than firms based in the North given the same choice of FDI destination. This may explain
in part the dominance of MNEs from the North.
Proposition 2 Multinational firms headquartered in countries of lower institutional quality invests
more in informal institution: ∂I
FDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
> 0. As a corollary, multinational firms headquartered
in countries of lower institutional quality are more effective at reducing its overhead fixed cost at a
given FDI destination: df(rd,I
FDI,∗)
drh
< 0.
Proof. Let fI(r, I) ≡ ∂f(r,I)∂I and fII(r, I) ≡ ∂
2f(r,I)
∂I2
. The FOC for IFDI,∗ requires that at IFDI,∗,
fI(rh, I) + fI(rd, I) + k
′(I) = 0. (4)
Take total differentiation of (4) with respect to rh and I
FDI,∗, we have
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
= −
∂fI(rh,I)
∂rh
fII(rh, I) + fII(rd, I) + k′′(I)
> 0
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at IFDI,∗ by the SOC for IFDI,∗ and the assumption in (2).4 As a corollary,
df(rd, I
FDI,∗)
drh
= fI(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
< 0
by the assumption fI(r, I) < 0 and the previous result
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
> 0.
Intuitively, the marginal benefit for a firm to invest in informal institution is higher if it is based
in a country of poorer institutions, because the informal institution is more useful in environments
where the formal institution is lacking (by reducing the fixed overhead cost of the headquarter
operation). The heavier investment in informal institution in turn enables these firms to reduce by
more the overhead production cost at the FDI destination. Propositions 1 and 2 together imply
that for given FDI destination rd, although South-based MNEs (MNEs based in countries with
poorer state institutions rh) have a higher total fixed cost of operation F
FDI,∗ due to their home
institutional disadvantage and the higher cost incurred to build I, they actually have a lower fixed
cost of production f(rd, I) at the FDI destination.
2.2 Optimal FDI Destination
Having characterized the endogenous choice of informal institution by firms for given (rh, rd), I now
characterize their optimal choice of FDI destination (rd). If a firm chooses to produce locally, its
net profit is
ΠD ≡ piD − F ∗(rh) = Bφ˜ (wh)1−σ − F ∗(rh), (5)
which increases in φ˜ linearly. Note that F ∗(rh) has taken into account the optimal choice I∗ given
the home institutional environment rh. If a firm chooses to undertake FDI, its net profit is instead
ΠFDI = piFDI − FFDI,∗(rh, rd) = Bφ˜
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ − FFDI,∗(rh, rd), (6)
where again FFDI,∗(rh, rd) has taken into account the optimal choice IFDI,∗ for given destination
rd and the MNE’s home condition rh. In the current setting, since the fixed cost of production
for FDI is higher than local production by Proposition 1(ii), if firms choose FDI, they necessarily
4I impose the necessary condition on fII(r, I) to ensure that the SOC, fII(rh, I) + fII(rd, I) + k
′′(I) > 0, is
satisfied. Given the convexity of k(I), a sufficient condition is fII(r, I) > 0.
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choose a destination with rd > rh (such that wd < wh) that generates a higher variable profit. This
is in line with most vertical-FDI models in the literature, where FDI is driven by differences in
production cost across countries. Of course, in the data, reverse FDI (rd < rh) may arise due to
factors not modelled in the paper, such as market access and technology acquisition motives.
Among possible destinations of FDI, firms trade off lower wages in countries of poorer institu-
tions with higher fixed costs, and choose rd that maximizes (6). The FOC for the optimal choice
r∗d requires that at r
∗
d:
∂piFDI
∂wd
ω′(rd)− ∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
= 0, (7)
where I have applied the envelope theorem to FFDI,∗(rh, rd). This defines the optimal choice of the
FDI destination r∗d as an implicit function of the firm, industry and home country characteristics:
r∗d ≡ H(rh, φ˜, B, η), including the home institution rh, the firm productivity level φ˜, the world
demand for the sector B, and the headquarter intensity of the industry η.
Proposition 3 (i) (Complementarity in Institutional Qualities) All else being equal, a firm
will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional
quality at home:
∂r∗d
∂rh
> 0; (ii) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries
of poorer institutional qualities, the more productive the firm is:
∂r∗d
∂φ˜
> 0; (iii) All else being equal, a
firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the larger the world
demand for the sector is:
∂r∗d
∂B > 0; (iv) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in
countries of poorer institutional qualities, the less headquarter-intensive the sector is:
∂r∗d
∂η < 0.
Proof. (i) Totally differentiate (7) with respect to r∗d and rh, we obtain
∂r∗d
∂rh
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
ω′(rd)ω′(rh)− ∂
2f
∂I∂rd
∂IFDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
> 0. (8)
The inequality holds since ∂
2ΠFDI
∂r2d
< 0 by the SOC for r∗d, and the numerator is positive by the
facts that: (a) ∂
2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
= η(1− η)(1− σ)2piFDI/(whwd) > 0 and ω′(r) < 0 and (b) ∂
2f
∂I∂rd
< 0 by the
assumption in (2) and ∂I
FDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
> 0 by Proposition 2.5
5I make the necessary assumptions on ω′′(r) and ∂
2f(r,I)
∂r2
to ensure that the SOC, ∂
2ΠFDI
∂r2
d
< 0, for r∗d is satisfied.
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(ii) Similarly, taking total differentiation of (7) with respect to r∗d and φ˜, we have
∂r∗d
∂φ˜
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂φ˜
ω′(rd)
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
> 0, (9)
because ∂
2piFDI
∂wd∂φ˜
= (1− η)(1− σ)piFDI/(wdφ˜) < 0 and ω′(r) < 0.
(iii) It is straightforward to see that B has an analogous (positive) effect as φ˜ on r∗d, because B
and φ˜ enter piFDI multiplicatively.
(iv) Finally, by similar derivations, we have
∂r∗d
∂η
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂η
ω′(rd)
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
< 0,
where ∂
2piFDI
∂wd∂η
= (1 − σ)
[
(1− η)(1− σ) ln whwd − 1
]
piFDI/wd > 0, since wh > wd (rd > rh) holds at
the optimal choice of destination.
Institutional complementarity across the source and the destination of bilateral FDI flows arises
for two reasons. First, firms based in countries of poorer institutional qualities tend to be more
heavily endowed with firm-specific informal institutions, which gives them a comparative advan-
tage in conducting FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities (as the adverse effect of weak
institutions at the destination on fixed cost is reduced by the firm-specific institutional investment,
and more so in destinations of poorer institutions). This is the main mechanism the paper wishes
to highlight. In addition, given the supermodularity between the headquarter and the intermediate
component implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function, a lower wage at home (a lower-cost
headquarter input) also increases the marginal benefit (increments in variable profits) of securing
a lower-cost manufactured component. This second mechanism (through the variable cost) rein-
forces the main mechanism (through the fixed cost) and strengthens the complementarity effect in
institutions. We could potentially do away with the supermodular production function, such that
only the first mechanism is at work. The institutional complementarity effect will continue to hold.
A larger φ˜ or B increases the marginal benefit of having a lower wage wd at the FDI destination,
since the market share (or size) at stake is larger. This encourages the firm to take on higher fixed
costs associated with investing in countries of poorer institutional qualities so as to access the
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cheaper labor pool in these destinations. In contrast, when a sector is more headquarter intensive,
the cost of the manufactured component becomes less a concern, which weakens the incentive of
firms to locate FDI in countries with weaker institutional support.
The prediction that a more productive firm will choose to engage FDI in countries of poorer
institutions may come across as a surprising result. But it is no different from the traditional
vertical-FDI models where the more productive firms in the North are more likely than the less
productive firms to engage FDI in the South: the more productive firms with larger market shares
stand to gain more from the lower variable production cost in the South, and at the same time,
they are able to take on the higher fixed cost of production. We can think of some possible factors
outside the model that may moderate this stark prediction. I discuss them in Section 2.5.
2.3 Sorting of Firms
Proposition 3(ii) (that the more productive firms choose FDI in countries of poorer institutions)
implies that the net profit function of FDI will be an increasing and convex function of firm
productivity level φ˜ for a given sector and home country. To see this, define
ΠFDI,∗∗ ≡ max
rd
{
piFDI(rh, rd, φ˜, B, η)− FFDI,∗(rh, rd)
}
and piFDI,∗∗ and FFDI,∗∗ the corresponding variable profit and fixed cost given the optimal choice
of destination r∗d. Applying the envelope theorem, we have
dΠFDI,∗∗
dφ˜
=
∂piFDI,∗∗
∂φ˜
= B(wηhw
1−η
d )
1−σ > 0;
d2ΠFDI,∗∗
dφ˜2
= (1− η)(1− σ)w−1d B(wηhw1−ηd )1−σω′(r∗d)
∂r∗d
∂φ˜
> 0,
where the sign for the second derivative follows by Proposition 3(ii). In addition, by Proposi-
tion 1(iii) and Proposition 3(ii) again, we have
dFFDI,∗∗
dφ˜
=
dFFDI,∗∗
dr∗d
dr∗d
dφ˜
> 0.
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Thus, as the more productive firms choose FDI in countries of higher rd, they earn a higher
variable profit margin but also incur a higher fixed cost. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by firms
of three representative productivity levels φ˜1 < φ˜2 < φ˜3. Their respective choice of rd (with
rd,1 < rd,2 < rd,3) implies increasingly steeper variable profit margins and higher fixed costs. The
net profit function ΠFDI,∗∗ corresponds to the upper contour of the net profit functions across the
continuum of FDI destinations.
The profit function of producing locally and that of FDI are juxtaposed in Figure 2. Given a
convex profit function ΠFDI,∗∗ for FDI but a linear one for local production, and a higher fixed
cost for FDI than local production (Proposition 1(ii)), there exists a productivity level φ˜FDI at
which firms are indifferent between FDI and local production (ΠFDI,∗∗ = ΠD). Let φ˜D denote
the productivity cutoff level for local firms to break even. I assume ΠFDI,∗∗(φ˜D) < 0 such that
firms are sorted into local firms and multinational firms. Specifically, firms with φ˜ ∈ [φ˜min, φ˜D] will
choose not to produce and exit the industry, firms with φ˜ ∈ [φ˜D, φ˜FDI ] will produce locally, and
firms with φ˜ ∈ [φ˜FDI , φ˜max] will undertake FDI. The cutoffs are defined implicitly by:
Bφ˜Dω(rh)
1−σ = F ∗(rh); (10)
Bφ˜FDI
[
ω(rh)
ηω(rd(φ˜
FDI))1−η
]1−σ −Bφ˜FDIω(rh)1−σ = FFDI,∗(rh, rd(φ˜FDI))− F ∗(rh).(11)
The sorting condition ΠFDI,∗∗(φ˜D) < 0 can be rewritten as:
(
ω(rh)
ω(rd(φ˜D))
)(1−η)(σ−1)
< F
FDI,∗(rh,rd(φ˜D))
F ∗(rh)
,
that is, the extra fixed cost of FDI dominates the wage advantage FDI offers for the least productive
surviving firms (given its endogenous choice of rd). I assume that this condition holds since sorting
of firms by productivity levels into domestic and multinational ones is well documented.
2.4 Aggregate Bilateral FDI
As suggested by Figure 1, in the limiting scenario with a continuum of destinations rd, for each
destination rod, there is one unique productivity level φ˜
o of firms in each sector that consider rod as the
optimal FDI destination. To arrive at an expression for the aggregate bilateral FDI at the country
level, I impose some structures on the sectoral-level parameters. In general, sectors may differ in
terms of its global market size B, headquarter intensity η and firm productivity distribution. For
simplicity, I suppress the latter two sectoral heterogeneity and work with only the sectoral demand
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heterogeneity because of its simple multiplicative relationship with firm productivity. I discuss the
possibility of generalizing the framework in Section 2.5.
Suppose that the global market size has a uniform distribution across sectors such that B ∼
U(0, 1). In addition, assume that firm productivity in each sector follow the same cumulative
density function G(φ˜) with support φ˜ ∈ [1,∞).
For illustrative purposes, focus on a particular destination rod. For a given home country rh
and sector B, this pins down the firm productivity level φ˜o that will choose rod as a preferred FDI
destination. Specifically, the FOC for r∗d in (7) requires that φ˜
o = C(rh, r
o
d)/B, where C(rh, rd) ≡{
w
η(1−σ)
h w
(1−η)(1−σ)−1
d (1− η)(1− σ)ω′(rd)
}−1
∂f(rd,I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
is a constant given rh and rd. Thus, a
lower sectoral demand B raises the corresponding productivity level of firms that would prefer rod.
More formally, we have dφ˜o/dB = −φ˜o/B.
Whether the firm indeed undertakes FDI in rod, however, depends on whether the firm produc-
tivity level φ˜o exceeds the threshold φ˜FDI . If this is not the case, the FDI profit ΠFDI,∗∗ falls
short of domestic profit ΠD and FDI will not realize. Using the cutoff condition (11) for FDI,
we can similarly derive the effect of the sectoral demand B on the cutoff productivity φ˜FDI . In
particular, take total differentiation of (11) with respect to B and φ˜FDI , applying the FOC (7), we
have dφ˜FDI/dB = −φ˜FDI/B. Thus, a lower sectoral demand also raises the productivity cutoff for
FDI.
Given the response of φ˜o and φ˜FDI to the sectoral demand B, we can characterize the bilateral
FDI flows across sectors and country pairs. Starting with the highest sectoral demand level B = 1,
label the corresponding productivity level in this sector that would prefer rod to the other FDI
locations as φ˜o(1) and the FDI cutoff level in this sector as φ˜FDI(1). It turns out that there are
only two possible scenarios.
2.4.1 zero bilateral FDI at the aggregate
In the first scenario, suppose φ˜o(1) < φ˜FDI(1) holds. This implies zero FDI in rod from rh in the
sector with the largest demand. As we look across sectors with lower B, since
∣∣∣dφ˜o/dB∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣−φ˜o/B∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣−φ˜FDI/B∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣dφ˜FDI/dB∣∣∣ , (12)
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φ˜o rises by less than φ˜FDI . As a result, the firm who might prefer rod as a possible FDI destination
in a sector always finds domestic production preferable to FDI. Thus, there would be no FDI in rod
from rh for all B ∈ [0, 1], and zero bilateral FDI at the aggregate.
2.4.2 positive bilateral FDI at the aggregate
On the other hand, suppose φ˜o(1) > φ˜FDI(1) holds, which implies positive FDI from rh in r
o
d in
the sector with the highest demand. Since in this case,
∣∣∣dφ˜o/dB∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣−φ˜o/B∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣−φ˜FDI/B∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣dφ˜FDI/dB∣∣∣ , (13)
φ˜o increases faster than φ˜FDI as B decreases. Hence, firms who might choose rod as a potential FDI
destination also find FDI more profitable relative to domestic production for all B ∈ [0, 1].
Aggregating across all sectors and firms, we have the bilateral FDI activity from country rh to
rod (when measured in net profit) as:
V (rh, r
o
d) ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
1
ΠFDI(φ˜, B, η; rh, r
o
d) δ
(
φ˜− φ˜o(B)
)
g(φ˜) dφ˜ dB
=
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
1
(
Bφ˜
(
wηh ω(r
o
d)
1−η)1−σ − FFDI,∗(rh, rod)) δ (φ˜− φ˜o(B)) g(φ˜) dφ˜ dB
=
∫ ∞
φ˜o(1)
(
C(rh, r
o
d)
(
wηh ω(r
o
d)
1−η)1−σ − FFDI,∗(rh, rod)) g(φ˜)dφ˜
=
(
C(rh, r
o
d)
(
wηh ω(r
o
d)
1−η)1−σ − FFDI,∗(rh, rod))∫ ∞
φ˜o(1)
g(φ˜)dφ˜
=
(
C(rh, r
o
d)
(
wηh ω(r
o
d)
1−η)1−σ − FFDI,∗(rh, rod))(1−G(φ˜o(1))) . (14)
where δ is a Dirac delta function and g ≡ dG/dφ˜ is the density function of firm productivity. Recall
that φ˜o(B) = C(rh, r
o
d)/B by the FOC (7). In the above derivations, the first equality holds because
B has a uniform distribution and only firms with productivity φ˜o(B) will choose to engage FDI in
destination rod in sectors with demand level B. The second equality substitutes in the expression of
the FDI profit, and the third equality follows by integrating over the combinations of (B, φ˜) that
satisfy the FOC (7) such that φ˜oB = C(rh, r
o
d). The lower bound φ˜
o(1) = C(rh, r
o
d) corresponds to
the productivity level of firms that choose rod in the sector with the highest demand (B = 1). As B
decreases toward zero across sectors, the corresponding productivity level of firms that choose rod
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increases toward infinity.
We may interpret the first term in (14) as reflecting the ‘intensive margin’ and the second term
the ‘extensive margin’ of FDI activity. They correspond, respectively, to the average net FDI profit
per firm and the mass of firms from country rh engaging FDI in country r
o
d.
6
Proposition 4 (Complementarity in Institutional Qualities at the Aggregate) Condi-
tional on positive bilateral FDI: (i) At the intensive margin, bilateral FDI activity at the country
aggregate level exhibits complementarity in institutional qualities: multinational firms generate more
net profits in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional environment at
home; (ii) At the extensive margin, bilateral FDI activity may exhibit complementarity in institu-
tional qualities (subject to certain qualifying conditions): more multinational firms conduct FDI in
countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional environment at home.
Proof. See the appendix for the proof of Proposition 4(ii).
Proposition 4(i) follows from the result ∂Π
FDI
∂rd∂rh
> 0 shown in the proof of (8). In particular,
∂ΠFDI
∂rd∂rh
corresponds to the numerator of (8) and is shown to be positive for arbitrary combinations
of (rh, rd, φ˜, B, η). This implies that the result
∂ΠFDI
∂rd∂rh
> 0 also holds for the profit function ΠFDI
in (14) when rd = r
o
d and (B, φ˜) satisfies the FOC (7). Thus, the intensive margin of FDI at
the aggregate turns out to inherit the same institutional complementarity mechanism shown for
individual firms in Proposition 3(i), with similar intuitions.
At the extensive margin, poorer institutions, as shown in Proposition 1(iv), raises the total fixed
cost of production for MNEs based in these countries, which reduces the outward FDI from the
South relative to the North. However, so long as this higher total fixed cost of FDI does not kill the
outward FDI from rh toward a destination r
o
d, home countries with poorer institutions have a larger
mass of firms investing in the given destination rod. Intuitively, the higher informal institutional
investment made by firms in the South allows less productive firms than their peers from the North
to survive in a given FDI destination.
6The intensive and extensive margins are defined here conditional on positive bilateral FDI flows. This is not
exactly the same as how these two margins are sometimes used in the literature. For example, some studies in
the trade literature define the extensive margin by the proportion of active trade status among the universe of
country-pairs, sectors, or product groups.
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Whether this advantage of the South at the extensive margin is stronger in destinations with
poorer institutions depends on two components. First, it depends on whether a higher rh lowers the
productivity cutoff φ˜o(1) by a larger margin in destinations of higher rod. The answer is positive on
second-order approximations. Next, it also depends on g′(φ˜o(1)), the curvature of the productivity
distribution at the cutoff. Intuitively, as rod increases and the corresponding productivity threshold
φ˜o(1) increases, the advantage of the South is stronger if g′(φ˜o(1)) > 0, as we move up to a
productivity level where the density of firms is higher; the reverse is true if g′(φ˜o(1)) < 0 holds.
Overall, the institutional complementarity effect will hold at the extensive margin if g′(·) is not too
negative such that the first positive component dominates.
2.5 Discussions of the Model
I discuss several possible extensions of the model for future work. First, in the model, I have implic-
itly assumed that labor productivity is the same across countries in the production of intermediate
(headquarter or manufactured) components for differentiated goods. We can relax this assumption
without affecting the result, if the wage rate adjusted for labor productivity is lower in countries
of poorer institutional qualities.
Second, for modeling simplicity, I have also assumed that informal institutional endowment is a
common good within the firm boundary and fully transnational (i.e., equally effective in combatting
weak formal institutions in foreign countries as at home). Admittedly, the informal institution
built likely cannot be fully transferred across countries. In alternative setups, we may allow firms
to build local informal institutions at home and in the host country separately. The main result
will continue to hold, so long as the level of informal institution that a firm can build in the host
country is constrained by its home institutional environment.
Third, in the literature, several studies have suggested that larger firms tend to be more po-
litically connected or politically active (Hellman et al., 2003; Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Chen
et al., 2011). In the current setup, domestic firms do not differ in their choices of I. However, as
shown by Proposition 3(ii), conditional on firms making the cutoff for FDI, the more productive
firms will choose FDI destinations of higher rd. Since the more productive firms are also larger and
the informal institution a firm develops increases with rd in the current model, this establishes a
positive correlation between firm size and firm-specific investment in informal institutions.
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Fourth, the prediction of Proposition 3(ii) is derived from pure vertical-FDI incentives. We
can think of some possible factors outside the model that may moderate this stark prediction. For
example, in alternative setups with trade frictions, firms may conduct FDI in several destinations
(of good or bad institutions) for market-access motives. Nonetheless, it is still likely that the lower
bound of institutional qualities at the destination that a firm engages FDI in will be lower, the higher
the firm productivity level (all else being equal). Intuitively, the higher fixed cost at a destination
of poorer institutional qualities raises the bar on firm entry. Yet another possible moderating
factor is quality control risk. If higher firm productivity is due to more sophisticated production
technology a firm uses, the higher risk of quality control failure may create disincentives for the
more productive firms to locate production in a country with lower wage but poorer institution
(Chang and Lu, 2012). As a result, there may arise a non-monotonic relationship between the firm
productivity level and the institutional quality of a firm’s chosen FDI destination.
Fifth, in deriving the aggregate bilateral FDI, I have assumed the firm productivity support
to be unbounded. We may instead impose some upper bound on the productivity support (a` la
Helpman et al., 2008). This will not affect the zero FDI conclusion in the first scenario (Section
2.4.1) but will introduce additional incidence of zero FDI in the second scenario (Section 2.4.2).
Zero FDI in this case will occur not only at the bilateral country level but also at the sectoral level.
In particular, let
¯˜
φ be the upper bound of the firm productivity support. Define b ≡ C(rh, rod)/ ¯˜φ;
ie., b is the cutoff on the sectoral demand where the most productive firm would undertake FDI in
rod from rh. For B < b, the required productivity level for a firm to choose r
o
d exceeds the upper
bound of the productivity support. Thus, FDI will occur only in sectors of sufficiently large demand
with B ∈ [b, 1] for given rh and rod. We have zero FDI from rh in rod in all sectors if b > 1.
Sixth, in deriving Proposition 4, I focus on the second-order (interaction) effects of home with
respect to host institutions on bilateral FDI flows. In doing so, I have assumed that firm pro-
ductivity distributions do not vary systematically across countries. If developed economies have a
“better” distribution, tilted towards higher productivity, it is likely that more firms would be able
to pay the fixed cost of FDI and set affiliates in countries with lower wages and poorer institutions.
In empirical exercises, I include home and host-country specific variables to control for such level
effects.
Seventh, in deriving the aggregate FDI flows, I have also suppressed possible heterogeneity in
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headquarter intensity across sectors. In principle, it is possible to introduce another layer of sub-
sectors characterized by η ∈ [0, 1] within each sector B ∈ [0, 1]. For given (B, η), we can identify
the unique productivity level φ˜o(B, η) of firms that would prefer rod as a FDI destination. Assume
η ∼ U(0, 1), the aggregate bilateral FDI can in principle be derived in a similar way as in (14).
The difficulty is to identify the boundary between zero and positive bilateral FDI in terms of both
parameters (B, η) and as a result, a closed-form solution for the aggregate bilateral FDI.
Without doubts, the current model has missed some relevant features of multinational produc-
tion, such as outsourcing and horizontal FDI. It is possible to introduce the sorting structure of
outsourcing and FDI a` la Antra`s and Helpman (2004) such that the fixed cost of FDI is greater
than outsourcing in the South taking into account the endogenous choice of firm-specific informal
institution, and at the same time, the FDI variable profit margin is steeper than outsourcing in a
given destination. Similar to how the FDI profit function is derived in Figure 1, the outsourcing
profit function taking into account firm’s optimal choice of destination will likely be an increasing
convex function and cut the domestic and FDI profit functions in the middle spectrum of firm
productivity, creating a lower cutoff for outsourcing and an upper cutoff for FDI. Institutional
complementarity effect at the firm level is likely to follow for outsourcing as for FDI by a similar
mechanism.
In models of horizontal FDI, firms may engage FDI in multiple destinations for market-access
motives. However, the same institutional complementarity effect identified in this paper at the firm
level is likely to apply to this alternative setting. Assume away differences in wage costs (and thus
vertical-FDI incentives). MNEs based in poorer institutions still have a comparative advantage
at reducing the overhead cost of FDI at the destination given their heavier informal institutional
investment at home, and thus will be more likely to choose FDI over exporting to serve the market
with poorer institutions, all else being equal.
Finally, in the empirical exercises that follow, I do not observe the cost structure or profit of
MNEs but bilateral FDI flows or stocks across countries at the aggregate. As an attempt to bridge
the theory and the empirics, we may suppose that the amount of investment that each firm is
willing to make is proportional to the expected net profit of FDI (the first term in (14)); thus, the
larger the expected net profit of FDI, the larger the amount of FDI flows per project (firm). Next,
we may think of the mass of firms (the second term in (14)) as the number of FDI projects that will
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be undertaken. Thus, the larger the amount of aggregate bilateral FDI profit expected, the larger
the amount of aggregate bilateral FDI flows. This helps establish a one-to-one mapping between
the theoretical concept in (14) and the empirical measure of FDI.
3 Empirical Evidence
Proposition 3(i) suggests that all else being equal, a MNE from a country with poorer institutional
quality than another MNE, will tend more likely to invest in a destination with poorer institutional
quality than the other MNE’s choice of destination. Proposition 4 suggests that this institutional
complementarity effect will also hold at the aggregate country level (subject to qualifying condi-
tions). I estimate the bilateral FDI volume at the aggregate using the following gravity equation:
ln(FDIdht) = β0 + β1 ln(gdpd,t−1) + β2 ln(gdph,t−1) + β3 ln(gdppcd,t−1) + β4 ln(gdppch,t−1)
+β5| ln(gdppcd,t−1)− ln(gdppch,t−1)|+ β6 ln(pd,t−1) + β7 ln(ph,t−1)
+β8Gd,t−1 + β9Gh,t−1 + β10(Gd,t−1 ∗Gh,t−1) + γXdh,t−1 + dht, (15)
where FDIdht denotes FDI in country d from country h in year t. In particular, the institutional
qualities of both the home (Gh,t−1) and destination (Gd,t−1) countries and their interaction term
(Gd,t−1 ∗ Gh,t−1) are included as part of the FDI determinants. Propositions 3(i) and 4 imply
a relational matching pattern in FDI in terms of institutions. Thus, a positive sign of β10 will
provide support for these hypotheses. On the other hand, an insignificant β10 would invalidate
these hypotheses, as in this case, the home or destination institution has a uniform impact on FDI
regardless of the partner country’s institutional conditions.
In developing the theoretical model, I have abstracted away from many potentially important
determinants of FDI suggested by the literature. I control for them empirically in (15). This
includes the economic size of the home and host countries (measured by their gross domestic
products, gdpd,t−1 and gdph,t−1), the income level of the two countries (measured by their GDPs per
capita, gdppcd,t−1 and gdppch,t−1), and the business operating costs of the two countries (measured
by their general price levels, pd,t−1 and ph,t−1). See Globerman and Shapiro (2002) for a literature
survey of how these variables may (or may not) affect FDI. I also include a long list of bilateral
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variables Xdh,t−1 typically used in the gravity literature to control for transaction and information
barriers including: distance, contiguity, common language, colonial relationship, regional trade
agreement (RTA), and currency union (CU). To this list I add bilateral investment treaty (BIT),
since in the context of FDI, the presence of BIT may affect the fixed cost of FDI and its pattern
as a result.
A recent study by Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) proposes a Linder hypothesis for FDI. This theory
suggests that MNEs will tend to invest in countries of similar income per capita, due to non-
homothetic preferences and the proximity-versus-concentration tradeoff in serving foreign markets.
This mechanism is controlled for by including the absolute value of the difference in log-per capita
income between the home and host countries | ln(gdppcd,t−1) − ln(gdppch,t−1)| as in their study.
Thus, the institutional complementarity effect presented below is independent of any potential
Linder effect due to income similarity.
3.1 Data and Measurement
The FDI data are sourced from the UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics, which consists of 206
economies reporting their FDI inward stock, outward stock, inward flows, and outward flows (in
current US dollars) from and to each of the partner countries during year 2001-2010. The set of
partner countries ever recorded includes 193 economies, 13 of them not in the set of reporters. To
my knowledge, this dataset is the most comprehensive in terms of country coverage on bilateral FDI
flows: including poor and institutionally weak countries as FDI source or destination countries.7
This is an advantage for this study, as it allows me to incorporate the less investigated spectrum
of South-South FDI.
In this dataset, the inward FDI series reported by the recipient country d (from h) is not
necessarily equal to the outward FDI series reported by the origin country h (to d). Given this, I
do not attempt to gauge or correct the measurement errors, but instead choose to measure FDIdht
alternately based on each of the four series reported and look for a robust pattern across the series.
I measure a country’s institutional quality based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI), 2013 Update, in six dimensions: voice and accountability (VA), political stability and ab-
sence of violence (PV), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL),
7http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx
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and control of corruption (CC).8 Details on the construction of these indicators can be found in
Kaufmann et al. (2010). Since these indicators are highly correlated with one another, I include
them one at a time in the estimation of (15). For each governance indicator, a country receives
both a point estimate ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), and a percentile
ranking among all countries. The higher the index, the better the institutional quality. I report
the results based on the point estimate, although the results are qualitatively similar based on the
percentile ranking.
The data on GDP and GDP per capita (in current US dollars) are based on the World Develop-
ment Indicators.9 I then construct the general price level of a country relative to the United States
by the ratio of its GDP (per capita) in current US dollars to its GDP (per capita) in current PPP
dollars. This variable aims to capture the overall cost of production (including, e.g., rent, wages,
intermediate materials and infrastructure) facing the firms operating in the country.
The transaction and information cost proxies Xdh,t−1 are compiled from several sources. The
CEPII website provides the data on bilateral distance, and whether two countries are contiguous
(contig), share a common language (comlang), have ever had a colonial link (colony), have had a
common colonizer after 1945 (comcol), are currently in a colonial relationship (curcol) or were/are
the same country (smctry).10 The data on whether two countries are currently in a regional trade
agreement (rta for 1958-2014), and whether they use a common currency (comcur for 1948-2009)
are retrieved from de Sousa’s website.11 Last but not least, the data on bilateral investment treaties
are obtained from UNCTAD. I construct a dummy variable that equals one if a BIT is currently
in force between a country pair and zero otherwise, according to the date a BIT enters into force
(and the date it is terminated if ever).12
All regressors (if time variant) are lagged one period relative to the FDI variable, to reduce the
8http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.
9http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (22-Jul-2014 update).
10http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6. See Mayer and Zignago (2011) for further
details. I corrected some coding errors of smctry in the original data, wherever they were not symmetric for the same
country pair dh and hd based on the information in http://www.worldstatesmen.org/, which is the same source used
by the original data to create the variable. Details on the entries corrected are available upon request.
11http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm. See also de Sousa (2012).
12The data were retrieved from the UNCTAD website in June 2013. The interface has since been migrated to
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. I corrected the original data downloaded in cases where BIT entries on
one side are missing or where the dates of entry into force are inconsistent between two BIT partner countries. The
corrections are made based on the updated information provided in the above website. I set the cutoff date to be
July 1st of the current year in defining the year-varying bit dummy.
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concern of reverse causality. I also experiment using longer lags of the right-hand-side variables in
unreported exercises, but the results are similar.
In sum, the study covers bilateral FDI stocks (flows) for 219 economies in 2001-2010, with
attrition in the sample size due to missing entries or gaps in the data. The effective sample size
varies, depending on the FDI series used and the estimation specification studied.13
Figure 3 illustrates the fraction of FDI inflows received from countries of poorer institutional
quality by the world as a whole, by host countries of poorer institutional quality and by host
countries of better institutional quality. To classify the source/destination of FDI by institutional
quality, I match the bilateral FDI data with the WGI data (with one-year lag). The cutoff for
each of the institutional quality indicators is set at the 65 percentile of its distribution to match
approximately the proportion of developing countries in the world (139 developing countries and
75 developed countries in 2015 by the World Bank classification).
Note that the fraction of FDI inflows from countries of poorer institutional quality shown in
Figure 3 is likely systematically under-reported than FDI inflows from developing countries reported
by UNCTAD (cited in the introduction) for a few reasons. First, the FDI data used to generate
the plot are aggregated from bilateral FDI entries, and bilateral FDI entries may not be separately
reported (and show up as missing) for minor sources (which tend to be less developed countries).
Second, even when the FDI data are not missing, the WGI data may be missing and more likely to
be missing for less developed countries. Third, the 65% cutoff also excludes the mass of transition
economies that fall into high-income (developed) countries. For these reasons, we will not focus on
the absolute magnitude of the numbers in Figure 3 but their relative magnitudes across groups of
reporting countries.
We see from Figure 3 that the share of FDI flows received by the institutionally poorer countries
from their counterparts are in general more than proportional to the latter’s weight in worldwide
FDI outflows. At the same time, the share of FDI flows received by the institutionally stronger
countries from poorer ones are less than proportional. The asymmetry is especially pronounced
when countries are classified by institutional quality in VA, GE and RQ, slightly less so in terms of
13The whole set of 219 economies consists of 206 reporting countries and 13 partner countries that did not appear
as reporting countries. Gaps in the data, for example, occur in the governance indicators, which are not available for
year 2001. Missing data arise mainly due to the dependent variable, although different country coverage across data
sources leads to missing data on the independent variables as well.
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RL and CC, and with no clear pattern in terms of PV.14 This provides a first illustrative evidence of
institutional complementarity in bilateral FDI flows. As we will see in the following analyses, this
complementarity effect still holds true after controlling for an extensive list of FDI determinants.
3.2 Results
Table 1 presents the OLS estimation result of (15) for FDI inward stock reported by the recipient
country. As shown by the table, the coefficient on (Gd ∗Gh) is positive and significant regardless of
the indicators used to measure institutional quality, supporting the paper’s theoretical prediction.
The Linder hypothesis of Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) is also supported overall by the data.
Most of the other coefficients are precisely estimated and consistent with ex ante theoretical
predictions. A larger home or host market size, a lower production cost at the destination and
a higher production cost at home, physical proximity, common language, colonial relationship,
and currency union all help raise bilateral FDI stock. Regional trade agreements and bilateral
investment treaties do not have robust positive effects on bilateral FDI. In fact, ironically, BIT is
shown to have a negative (and statistically significant) effect on inward FDI stock. This result,
however, is not robust to variations in estimation specifications as will be discussed later.
Table 2 summarizes the results when the FDI outward stock, inflows, or outflows are used
instead to measure the FDI activity. The sign of the coefficient on (Gd ∗Gh) is significantly positive
and amazingly robust across all FDI series and institutional indicators (except perhaps PV). The
Linder hypothesis of Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) receives empirical support from data on FDI stocks,
but not in terms of FDI flows. The results above are hardly affected if I also control for year
fixed-effects in the baseline specification (15).
I take the strength of the complementarity in institutions as reflecting the possibility for firms
to build firm-specific informal institutions to reduce fixed overhead costs of FDI. The strongest
complementarity is observed for RQ and weakest for PV in Table 2. This suggests that firms
‘born’ in countries of weak regulatory quality may find it easier to build informal institutions such
as political network to deal with red tapes than firms born in politically unstable and violence-
prone countries to build informal institutions such as private security forces to deal with civil
14The WGI data are missing for year 2001, which would be used to classify countries’ FDI flows in 2002. This
explains the missing entries in the figure for year 2002.
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riots, terrorism, or wars. To the extent that such informal institutions are too costly, we will
expect to observe weak (or no) complementarity effect. This is illustrated by the case of PV given
FDI outward stock (flows), where the sign for the coefficient on Gd is positive and for (Gd ∗ Gh)
insignificant, indicating a universal preference for a politically more stable host country. Without
the complementarity effect, the positive sign for the coefficient on Gh implies that firms coming
from a politically more stable country also have a universal advantage in outward FDI, all else
being equal.
3.3 Robustness Checks
3.3.1 with multilateral fixed-effects (FE)
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it has become a regular practice to control for the
multilateral resistance to trade of exporting and importing countries in empirical trade analysis.
Several alternative theoretical foundations have been provided for such multilateral effects; see
for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002), Helpman et al. (2008) and Chaney (2008). In the FDI
literature, Head and Ries (2008) and de Sousa and Lochard (2011) developed models for bilateral
FDI that bear resemblance to the gravity equations for trade, suggesting the presence of multilateral
home- and host-country effects. In view of this, I include destination-country-year and home-
country-year FE as a robustness check. The fixed effects are allowed to vary by year given the
panel data structure.
Table 3 summarizes the results. The findings are quite similar regardless of the FDI series
used (in stocks or flows, reported by the recipient or the country of origin). The institutional
complementarity effect is robust to the inclusion of time-variant multilateral FE controls, and is
statistically significant overall. The effect tends to be stronger for VA, GE and RQ, weaker for RL
and CC, and absent for PV. This pattern suggests an interesting interpretation of the areas where
informal institutions are feasible and prevalent, and where they are not. Informal institutions tend
to be built in response to inefficient public services or poor policy formulation/implementation (GE
and RQ); these firm-specific investment corresponds to most likely political informal institutions
such as political network or connections. To some extent, such political informal institutions may
also help firms to maneuver in a society with less government political accountability (VA). On
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the other hand, economic and legal informal institutions such as relational contracting and private
enforcement mechanisms seem to be relatively costly for firms to build in response to inefficient
contract enforcement or rules of law (RL and CC). Finally, it appears extremely costly for firms
to build legal informal institutions such as private troops to guard against political violence or
terrorism (PV), as the institutional complementarity effect estimated in this area is weak at best.
The Linder hypothesis of Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) is now clearly supported by the data. Most
of the other variables (unreported) have qualitatively similar effects on FDI as in the benchmark.
In contrast, the BIT effect has in general become insignificant (rather than negative) and the RTA
effect has turned statistically positive.
3.3.2 with zero FDI observations
In the second robustness check, I take into account the presence of zero observations on FDI.
The raw data differentiate between missing data (data that are not available or are not separately
reported) and zero data (where the item is equal to zero or negligible). The pattern of zero and
missing FDI data however suggests some degrees of measurement errors (e.g., the recipient country
reports zero FDI while the origin country reports missing or positive FDI). Having no convincing
way of correcting the data, I choose to use only the positive and zero FDI entries, and treat the
missing FDI entries as literally missing and drop them from the analysis.15
In unreported exercises, I conduct Probit estimations and find that the same set of regressors in
specification (15) have good explanatory powers of the likelihood of having an active bilateral FDI
relation (in terms of either stocks or flows). In particular, the interaction term of institutions have
the same positive effect on the likelihood of an active bilateral FDI status as on the volume of FDI
reported above. Given this, I estimate the joint effects on both margins using the Tobit estimation
method a` la Eaton and Kortum (2001). This is implemented by the STATA intreg command, where
the lower censoring point is allowed to vary across observations and set at the minimum positive
value reported by each reporting country. For example, the lower censoring point is $1 million US
dollars for FDI inward stock reported by the United States, and $2000 US dollars for FDI outward
flow reported by El Salvador.
15I also drop the negative FDI entries from the analysis, as they cannot be accounted for by the current theoretical
or empirical framework.
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As shown in Table 4, the coefficient on (Gd ∗Gh) now roughly doubles compared to the bench-
mark, and is significantly positive across all institutional quality indicators and FDI series. Overall,
the complementarity effect is still the strongest in terms of VA, GE and RQ, and the weakest in
terms of PV, with RL and CC somewhere in between.
The evidence for the Linder hypothesis is not uniform: it is generally stronger in terms of the FDI
stocks, and weaker or absent in terms of the FDI flows, similar to the benchmark. The coefficient
estimates for most other variables (unreported) increase in magnitude relative to the benchmark, as
may be expected given that OLS estimates of bottom truncated data tend to be downward biased
toward zero. In particular, the sign of BIT turns around and becomes significantly positive. This
indicates the importance of BIT at driving the extensive margin of FDI. For example, signing a
BIT increases the latent bilateral inward FDI stock by around 30%, an economically significant
figure. This is also supported by the unreported Probit estimations where BIT is found invariably
to raise the likelihood of positive FDI.
3.3.3 more robustness checks
I conduct several other robustness checks in terms of the measures of institutional quality, the
samples, the estimators, and the estimation specifications. First, the results are qualitatively
similar if we measure the institutional quality of a country by its percentile ranking instead of
point estimate from WGI. Second, by dropping territories that are considered tax havens, the
institutional complementarity effect estimates turn out to be stronger in general across all FDI
measures and institutional indicators.16 Third, I repeat the estimations using different subsets of
countries in income levels (setting income ceiling for the FDI recipient countries at the 25%, 50%,
or 75% of all countries in the current year). The institutional complementarity effect still holds in
general, across variations in the estimation specifications or by allowing for zero FDI observations.
In dealing with zero FDI observations, I have taken the Tobit approach a` la Eaton and Kortum
16I consider two alternative lists of tax havens. The first list was published by the EU on 18 June 2015. This
includes (30 of them): Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British
Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Mal-
dives, Nauru, Niue, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and
the Grenadines, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos, US Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu (http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
eu/economy-politics.120n). The second, shorter, list by Investopedia consists of: Andorra, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Liechtenstein, Mauri-
tius, Monaco, Panama, Switzerland and St. Kitts and Nevis (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxhaven.asp).
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(2001). This approach supposes that there is a minimum level of FDI, such that if the latent value
FDI∗dht falls below this threshold, we observe FDIdht = 0 but otherwise we observe FDIdht =
FDI∗dht. For example, FDI values that fall short of a certain threshold may fail to be recognized by
government agencies. This approach is also consistent with a structural interpretation of zero FDI,
where FDI activity is observed only if the profits of FDI exceed that of domestic production. Thus,
the intensive and extensive margins (at the bilateral country level) are inherently related: a FDI
relation is more likely to be dormant where potential FDI profit is small. Another popular approach
in the trade literature proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), in contrast, treats zeros as random
realizations modelled by the Poisson process, and estimates the dependent variable in levels with
the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (PPML). When I apply the PPML estimator to
the FDI data, the results are not as regular as the Tobit estimates. The coefficient on the income
difference has the wrong (positive) sign and rejects the Linder hypothesis of Fajgelbaum et al.
(2015). The coefficient on the institutional interaction term is not as uniformly precisely estimated
as in the Tobit estimation, although the signs are correct in most cases and statistically significant
in several cases.17
To exclude the possibility that South-South FDI may be driven by their similarity in industrial
structures, I repeat the estimations by including an index of industrial structure similarity between
two countries.18 The industrial structure similarity index does not have a robust sign or significant
effect on FDI flows. The coefficient on the institutional interaction term remains positive and
significant overall across all estimations (benchmark, with multilateral effects, or with zero FDI
observations).
There may be concerns that the coefficient estimate on the institutional interaction term is pick-
ing up higher-order effects of institutions on FDI. However, any such nonlinear effects of institutions
(such as G2h,t−1 and G
2
d,t−1) would have been absorbed by the multilateral home-country-year and
host-country-year fixed effects, and as shown in Table 3, the positive institutional complementarity
17See Head and Mayer (2015, p. 178–180) for further discussions of these two approaches (Tobit and PPML), in
particular, their difference in interpretations based on structural versus random zeros.
18The measure is constructed as indsimdht = 1 −
√∑J
j=1(vadt,j − vaht,j)2/J , where vadt,j is the value added of
sector j in year t (as a percentage of GDP of country d) and similarly defined for vaht,j . Data are taken from World
Development Indicators, 11/12/2015 Update. Data are available on four distinct sectors: agriculture (ISIC divisions
1-5), manufacturing industry (ISIC divisions 15-37), non-manufacturing industry (ISIC divisions 10-14 and 38-45;
including mining, construction, electricity, water, and gas), and services (ISIC divisions 50-99).
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effect is robust to the inclusion of such fixed effects.
Culture (socially shared values) and institutions (socially shared rules) are two concepts that
are sometimes difficult to disentangle, and likely to be highly correlated with each other. In the list
of regressors in (15), I have controlled for dimensions of culture in terms of language and the current
and past colonial relationships between countries. The above results show that institution has its
own independent effects on FDI flows. I also repeat the estimations by including an index of religion
similarity between countries as an extra control for cultural similarity.19 Similarity in religion
compositions between two countries helps raise bilateral FDI flows. However, the institutional
complementarity effect remains positive and significant overall across all estimations (with the
same caveat regarding PV).
Finally, given that institutional quality does not change much over time, we may also consider
restricting the analysis to a cross-sectional analysis by taking the average of the FDI measures, the
institutional quality, and the other time-variant variables during 2001-2010. I run cross-sectional
estimations in parallel to the baseline specification (15), the specification with multilateral FE, and
the Tobit estimation with zero FDI. The institutional complementarity effect is in general stronger
and similar in patterns as documented for the panel analysis.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework to micro-found the hypothesis that South-based
MNEs have a comparative advantage to deal with the inefficiency associated with weak formal
institutions and to maneuver in relationship-based investment environment, relative to their peers
from the North. The theory predicts a complementarity in institutional qualities of the home and
host countries in bilateral FDI flows. This helps explain the greater presence of South-based MNEs
in countries of relatively poorer institutions.
I conduct an extensive econometric test of the theory using bilateral FDI for 219 economies in
year 2001-2010. The results indicate a statistically significant complementarity effect between the
19The religion index is constructed based on the religion dataset of Maoz and Henderson (2013). The index
follows Maoz and Henderson (2013) and measures the similarity of religious compositions between two countries as
relsimhdt = 1 −
√∑R
r=1(raht,r − radt,r)2/R, where raht,r is the proportion of population in country h in year t
that are adherents of religion r and similarly defined for radt,r. I used the top four religion categories: Christianity,
Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. The results are similar if I use instead all 14 listed religion categories.
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home and destination institutional qualities. The finding is robust to the FDI series studied, the
institutional indicators used, the inclusion of multilateral country-fixed effects, and the considera-
tion of zero FDI. The effect tends to be stronger with the inclusion of zero FDI and for dimensions
of institutions where the scope for firms to build informal institutions is bigger. These are in line
with the theoretical mechanism proposed in the paper and its implications.
In addition to predictions on the bilateral FDI activity at the country level, the paper’s theoret-
ical framework also suggests several interesting testable predictions at the firm and sectoral levels.
In particular, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities,
the poorer the institutional quality at home, the more productive the firm is, the larger the world
demand for a sector is, and the less headquarter-intensive a sector is, all else being equal. I leave
the test of these hypotheses to future work with firm-level and sectoral-level FDI data.
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Math Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4(ii). To derive the effect of institutions on the extensive margin of FDI, I
proceed in three steps. First, note that ∂φ˜
o(1)
∂rh
< 0. To see this, use Proposition 3(i) and 3(ii). Since
both rh and φ˜ raise the optimal choice of rd, the two must move in opposite directions holding the
destination rod constant. More formally, taking total differentiation of (7) with respect to rh and φ˜,
setting drd = 0, we have
∂φ˜o(1)
∂rh
= −
∂ΠFDI
∂rod∂rh
(1− η)(1− σ)wη(1−σ)h w(1−η)(1−σ)−1d ω′(rod)
< 0, (16)
where both the numerator and the denominator are positive as shown in the proof of (8) and (9).
Given the above result, it follows that
∂
(
1−G(φ˜o(1))
)
∂rh
= −g(φ˜o(1))∂φ˜
o(1)
∂rh
> 0. (17)
Next, I analyze whether this advantage of the South at the extensive margin is stronger in
destinations with poorer institutions:
∂2
(
1−G(φ˜o(1))
)
∂rod∂rh
= −g(φ˜o(1)) ∂
2φ˜o(1)
∂rod∂rh︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
−g′(φ˜o(1)) ∂φ˜
o(1)
∂rh︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂φ˜o(1)
∂rod︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
. (18)
The first component in (18) verifies whether a higher rh lowers φ˜
o(1) by a larger margin in destina-
tions of higher rod. The answer is a qualified yes. To show this, use the result in (9) setting B = 1,
we have
∂φ˜o(1)
∂rod
= −
∂2ΠFDI
∂(rod)
2
(1− η)(1− σ)wη(1−σ)h w(1−η)(1−σ)−1d ω′(rod)
> 0, (19)
where the numerator is negative by the SOC for r∗d (= r
o
d) and the denominator is positive. As
suggested by Proposition 3(ii), the more productive firms will choose destinations with higher rd.
Thus, a destination of higher rd will attract on average the more productive firms. Note that the
denominator in (19) increases in rh. On the other hand, the derivative of the numerator with respect
to rh involves third-order derivatives of Π
FDI (with respect to r2d and rh), which cannot be signed.
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Suppose we can safely ignore the higher-order changes in the numerator as rh changes; the effect of
rh on the denominator in (19) implies that
∂2φ˜o(1)
∂rod∂rh
< 0. Thus, on second-order approximations, the
first component in (18) is positive, implying an institutional complementarity effect at the extensive
margin.
Turn to the second component of (18). Its sign depends on g′(φ˜o(1)), the curvature of the
productivity distribution at φ˜o(1). If g′(φ˜o(1)) is positive, we have an unambiguous positive com-
plementarity effect, reinforcing the first component in (18). Intuitively, as rod increases and the
corresponding φ˜o(1) increases, we are evaluating (17) at a productivity level where the density of
firms is higher if g′(φ˜o(1)) > 0, creating a positive complementarity effect. The reverse is true if
g′(φ˜o(1)) < 0 holds.
Overall, the complementarity effect in institutions will hold at the extensive margin if g′(·) is
not too negative such that the first positive component in (18) dominates.
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Figure 3: Fraction of FDI flows received from countries of poorer institutional quality (based on
FDI inflows reported by receiving countries)
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Table 1: Positive bilateral FDI—inward stock reported by the recipient country
FDI inward stock VA PV GE RQ RL CC
ln(gdpd) 0.586
∗∗∗ 0.617 ∗∗∗ 0.565 ∗∗∗ 0.581 ∗∗∗ 0.584 ∗∗∗ 0.584 ∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(gdph) 0.449
∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.437 ∗∗∗ 0.449 ∗∗∗ 0.451 ∗∗∗ 0.454 ∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
ln(gdppcd) -0.029 -0.143
∗∗ -0.146 ∗∗∗ -0.148 ∗∗∗ -0.138 ∗∗ -0.159 ∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053)
ln(gdppch) 0.262
∗∗∗ 0.165 ∗∗∗ 0.091 0.172 ∗∗∗ 0.099 ∗ 0.082
(0.054) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056)
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.125 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.066 ∗ -0.035 -0.073 ∗ -0.098 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037)
ln(pd) -0.088 -0.088 -0.271
∗∗ -0.303 ∗∗ -0.301 ∗∗ -0.342 ∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.120) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124)
ln(ph) 0.840
∗∗∗ 1.080 ∗∗∗ 0.932 ∗∗∗ 1.020 ∗∗∗ 0.879 ∗∗∗ 0.856 ∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.132) (0.136) (0.136) (0.133) (0.132)
Gd -0.124
∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗ 0.224 ∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.072) (0.080) (0.066) (0.059)
Gh 0.097
∗ 0.175 ∗∗∗ 0.257 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.290 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.059) (0.069) (0.060) (0.050)
Gd ∗Gh 0.267 ∗∗∗ 0.082 ∗ 0.298 ∗∗∗ 0.400 ∗∗∗ 0.283 ∗∗∗ 0.210 ∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.055) (0.045) (0.034)
ln(distance) -0.486 ∗∗∗ -0.491 ∗∗∗ -0.525 ∗∗∗ -0.517 ∗∗∗ -0.509 ∗∗∗ -0.522 ∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
contig 0.535 ∗∗∗ 0.513 ∗∗∗ 0.552 ∗∗∗ 0.567 ∗∗∗ 0.560 ∗∗∗ 0.531 ∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128)
comlang 1.164 ∗∗∗ 1.204 ∗∗∗ 1.100 ∗∗∗ 1.145 ∗∗∗ 1.106 ∗∗∗ 1.049 ∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088)
colony 0.876 ∗∗∗ 0.887 ∗∗∗ 0.898 ∗∗∗ 0.894 ∗∗∗ 0.892 ∗∗∗ 0.870 ∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.135) (0.134) (0.133) (0.136) (0.133)
comcol 0.417 ∗∗∗ 0.468 ∗∗∗ 0.313 ∗∗ 0.362 ∗∗∗ 0.337 ∗∗∗ 0.346 ∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.127) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
curcol 0.484 0.587 ∗ 0.736 ∗∗ 0.648 ∗∗ 0.735 ∗∗ 0.988 ∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.328) (0.349) (0.313) (0.345) (0.370)
smctry 0.165 0.089 0.126 0.145 0.187 0.202
(0.229) (0.228) (0.225) (0.227) (0.227) (0.225)
rta 0.030 0.154 ∗∗ 0.007 -0.017 0.037 0.064
(0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076)
comcur 0.713 ∗∗∗ 0.739 ∗∗∗ 0.756 ∗∗∗ 0.745 ∗∗∗ 0.710 ∗∗∗ 0.746 ∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.145) (0.142) (0.146) (0.144)
bit -0.176 ∗∗∗ -0.229 ∗∗∗ -0.163 ∗∗∗ -0.212 ∗∗∗ -0.157 ∗∗ -0.110 ∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
# Observations 24974 24959 24970 24970 24974 24970
R2 0.528 0.525 0.539 0.535 0.537 0.541
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs are reported in the parenthesis. The
entry ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
All regressors (if time variant) are lagged one period relative to the FDI variable.
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Table 2: Positive bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.125 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.066 ∗ -0.035 -0.073 ∗ -0.098 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037)
Gd -0.124
∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗ 0.224 ∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.072) (0.080) (0.066) (0.059)
Gh 0.097
∗ 0.175 ∗∗∗ 0.257 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.290 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.059) (0.069) (0.060) (0.050)
Gd ∗Gh 0.267 ∗∗∗ 0.082 ∗ 0.298 ∗∗∗ 0.400 ∗∗∗ 0.283 ∗∗∗ 0.210 ∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.055) (0.045) (0.034)
# Observations 24974 24959 24970 24970 24974 24970
R2 0.528 0.525 0.539 0.535 0.537 0.541
FDI outward stock:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.087 ∗∗ -0.168 ∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.033 -0.081 ∗ -0.093 ∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
Gh 0.053 0.281
∗∗∗ 0.323 ∗∗∗ 0.029 0.428 ∗∗∗ 0.533 ∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.055) (0.067) (0.079) (0.066) (0.055)
Gd 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.121 ∗∗ 0.121 0.235 ∗∗∗ 0.100 0.130 ∗∗
(0.058) (0.054) (0.076) (0.083) (0.069) (0.062)
Gd ∗Gh 0.270 ∗∗∗ 0.018 0.273 ∗∗∗ 0.348 ∗∗∗ 0.215 ∗∗∗ 0.184 ∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.046) (0.047) (0.058) (0.046) (0.034)
# Observations 22793 22782 22793 22793 22793 22793
R2 0.522 0.516 0.528 0.525 0.525 0.535
FDI inward flow:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.050 ∗ -0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.060 ∗ 0.053 0.010 0.016
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032)
Gd -0.103
∗∗ 0.214 ∗∗∗ -0.162 ∗∗ -0.066 -0.092 0.024
(0.051) (0.046) (0.069) (0.076) (0.064) (0.057)
Gh 0.097
∗∗ 0.076 ∗ 0.092 ∗ 0.007 0.207 ∗∗∗ 0.130 ∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.053) (0.062) (0.054) (0.044)
Gd ∗Gh 0.248 ∗∗∗ 0.133 ∗∗∗ 0.395 ∗∗∗ 0.444 ∗∗∗ 0.289 ∗∗∗ 0.263 ∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.038) (0.044) (0.055) (0.044) (0.033)
# Observations 19414 19403 19407 19407 19414 19407
R2 0.422 0.421 0.432 0.430 0.427 0.431
FDI outward flow:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.019 -0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.053 0.045 -0.003 0.011
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Gh -0.034 0.119
∗∗ 0.174 ∗∗∗ -0.022 0.254 ∗∗∗ 0.246 ∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.068) (0.058) (0.047)
Gd 0.066 0.161
∗∗∗ -0.107 0.041 0.010 0.019
(0.053) (0.048) (0.068) (0.075) (0.061) (0.057)
Gd ∗Gh 0.250 ∗∗∗ 0.047 0.328 ∗∗∗ 0.359 ∗∗∗ 0.216 ∗∗∗ 0.213 ∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.042) (0.032)
# Observations 16305 16299 16304 16304 16305 16304
R2 0.442 0.436 0.449 0.445 0.444 0.449
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors are omitted in
the table.
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Table 3: Positive bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows; with multilateral FE controls
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.230 ∗∗∗ -0.314 ∗∗∗ -0.188 ∗∗∗ -0.236 ∗∗∗ -0.231 ∗∗∗ -0.198 ∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
Gd ∗Gh 0.174 ∗∗∗ -0.056 0.163 ∗∗∗ 0.109 ∗∗ 0.092 ∗∗ 0.113 ∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.038) (0.043) (0.049) (0.042) (0.031)
# Observations 25692 25677 25688 25688 25692 25688
R2 0.716 0.714 0.715 0.714 0.715 0.715
FDI outward stock:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.271 ∗∗∗ -0.397 ∗∗∗ -0.249 ∗∗∗ -0.276 ∗∗∗ -0.328 ∗∗∗ -0.257 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Gd ∗Gh 0.184 ∗∗∗ -0.126 ∗∗∗ 0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.138 ∗∗∗ 0.027 0.103 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.040) (0.046) (0.053) (0.044) (0.032)
# Observations 23323 23312 23323 23323 23323 23323
R2 0.721 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.719 0.720
FDI inward flow:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.213 ∗∗∗ -0.280 ∗∗∗ -0.146 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.228 ∗∗∗ -0.187 ∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Gd ∗Gh 0.195 ∗∗∗ 0.024 0.222 ∗∗∗ 0.202 ∗∗∗ 0.087 ∗∗ 0.118 ∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.045) (0.037) (0.028)
# Observations 19905 19894 19898 19898 19905 19898
R2 0.643 0.640 0.642 0.642 0.641 0.641
FDI outward flow:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.223 ∗∗∗ -0.313 ∗∗∗ -0.197 ∗∗∗ -0.226 ∗∗∗ -0.271 ∗∗∗ -0.233 ∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
Gd ∗Gh 0.173 ∗∗∗ -0.048 0.158 ∗∗∗ 0.135 ∗∗∗ 0.036 0.071 ∗∗
(0.033) (0.037) (0.041) (0.049) (0.039) (0.030)
# Observations 16681 16675 16680 16680 16681 16680
R2 0.661 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659
Controls:
Home Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors are omitted in the table.
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Table 4: Zero augmented bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.126 ∗∗∗ -0.254 ∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.029 -0.056 -0.106 ∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047)
Gd -0.095 0.355
∗∗∗ 0.161 ∗ 0.287 ∗∗∗ 0.059 0.156 ∗∗
(0.073) (0.069) (0.092) (0.105) (0.087) (0.077)
Gh -0.268
∗∗∗ -0.009 0.068 -0.244 ∗∗∗ 0.160 ∗∗ 0.225 ∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.081) (0.091) (0.080) (0.068)
Gd ∗Gh 0.554 ∗∗∗ 0.178 ∗∗∗ 0.521 ∗∗∗ 0.641 ∗∗∗ 0.511 ∗∗∗ 0.366 ∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.058) (0.059) (0.071) (0.059) (0.044)
# Observations 36587 36483 36567 36567 36587 36567
# Zeroes 11613 11524 11597 11597 11613 11597
FDI outward stock:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.135 ∗∗∗ -0.270 ∗∗∗ -0.101 ∗∗ -0.099 ∗ -0.122 ∗∗ -0.125 ∗∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051)
Gh -0.258
∗∗∗ 0.293 ∗∗∗ 0.626 ∗∗∗ -0.007 0.654 ∗∗∗ 0.690 ∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.071) (0.092) (0.107) (0.090) (0.075)
Gd -0.039 -0.029 -0.159 0.159 -0.190
∗∗ -0.156 ∗
(0.075) (0.074) (0.099) (0.113) (0.092) (0.080)
Gd ∗Gh 0.514 ∗∗∗ 0.121 ∗∗ 0.442 ∗∗∗ 0.502 ∗∗∗ 0.393 ∗∗∗ 0.354 ∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.061) (0.062) (0.077) (0.062) (0.046)
# Observations 35225 35134 35225 35225 35225 35225
# Zeros 12432 12352 12432 12432 12432 12432
FDI inward flow:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| 0.006 -0.078 ∗∗ 0.108 ∗∗ 0.102 ∗∗ 0.029 0.023
(0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042)
Gd -0.204
∗∗∗ 0.396 ∗∗∗ -0.286 ∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.198 ∗∗ -0.055
(0.069) (0.062) (0.086) (0.097) (0.081) (0.072)
Gh 0.031 0.108
∗ 0.242 ∗∗∗ 0.020 0.390 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.060) (0.073) (0.084) (0.073) (0.060)
Gd ∗Gh 0.472 ∗∗∗ 0.204 ∗∗∗ 0.530 ∗∗∗ 0.610 ∗∗∗ 0.366 ∗∗∗ 0.324 ∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.052) (0.055) (0.067) (0.055) (0.042)
# Observations 36340 36236 36315 36315 36340 36315
# Zeros 16926 16833 16908 16908 16926 16908
FDI outward flow:
| ln(gdppcd)− ln(gdppch)| -0.056 -0.186 ∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.009 -0.046 -0.027
(0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047)
Gh -0.206
∗∗∗ 0.253 ∗∗∗ 0.327 ∗∗∗ -0.028 0.481 ∗∗∗ 0.430 ∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067) (0.080) (0.093) (0.082) (0.066)
Gd -0.061 0.096 -0.374
∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.200 ∗∗ -0.197 ∗∗
(0.072) (0.068) (0.091) (0.106) (0.083) (0.076)
Gd ∗Gh 0.547 ∗∗∗ 0.144 ∗∗ 0.555 ∗∗∗ 0.546 ∗∗∗ 0.394 ∗∗∗ 0.383 ∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.058) (0.056) (0.071) (0.058) (0.044)
# Observations 32913 32832 32900 32900 32913 32900
# Zeros 16608 16533 16596 16596 16608 16596
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors are omitted in
the table.
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